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The Maturity Structure  Firms tend  to match  assets
with liabilities, and  more
of Debt  proFitable  firms  have more
long-term  debt.  Long-term
Determinants  and Effects on Firms'  debt  has a positive effect on
firms' performance, but this is
Performance  not  true when  a large  fraction
of that debt  is subsidized.
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Summary findings
Schiantarelli and Sembenelli empirically investigate the  positivelv on the length of debt maturity when the
determinants and consequences of the maturity structure  maturity variable is entered both contemporaneously  and
of debt using data from a panel of UJ.K.  and Italian firms.  lagged.
They find that in choosing a maturity structure for  But in Italy the positive effect of the length of maturity
debt, firms tend to match assets and liabilities, as both  on prodiuctivity  is substantially reduced or even reversed
conventional wisdom and some recent theoretical models  the larger is the proportion  of subsidized credit.
suggest. They conclude that more profitable firms (as  Schiantarelli and Sembenelli document the relationship
measured by the ratio of cash flow to capital) tend to  between firms' characteristics and their choice of shorter
have more long-term debt. T  his finding is consistent with  or long-term debt by estimating a maturity equation  and
the dominant role played by firms' fear of liquidation  interpreting the results in light of insights from
and loss of control  associated with short-term debt. It  theoretical literature, and by analyzing the effects of
may also reflect the willingness of financial markets to  maturity on firms' later performance in terms of
provide long-term finance only to quality firms.  profitability, growth, and productivity. They estimate a
The data do not support the hypothesis that short-term  Cobb-Douglas production  function and assess how total
debt, through better monitoring and control, boosts  factor productivity depends on the degree of leverage
efficiency and growth. If anythirng,  the results support  and the proportion  of longer- and shorter-term  debt.
the opposite conclusion. In both countries the data  They also analyze the relationship between firms' debt
suggest a positive relationship betweeni initial debt  maturity and investment by estimating an accelerator
maturity and the firms' subsequent medium-term  type of investment eqLuation,  augmented by financial
performance in terms of profitability and growth in real  variables.
sales. In both countries total factor productivity depends
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1. Introduction
While there is a vast theoretical and empirical literature on firms' choice of the
overall degree of leverage, much less is known about the maturity structure of firms'
debt. Yet short and long term are by no means equivalent ways of financing firms'
acquisition of  real  assets,  as  they  have  different  incentive characteristics, and,
therefore, different effects on firms'  real performance.  This makes it imperative to
document the  nature  of  the  maturity  structure  of  debt,  and  to  investigate its
determinants  and consequences.  I
Such  an  analysis  has  potentially  important  policy  consequences,  since
governments  both in developed  and developing countries have often intervened in the
credit markets, to  foster the provision of long term debt finance. Presumably this
intervention was based on the idea that, because of imperfections  in capital markets,
there was an under-provision  of long term finance to at least certain categories  of firms
that kept them from exploiting  favorable investment  opportunities. This has led to the
development  of programs and institutions  that dispense long term credit to enterprises,
often (but not necessarily)  at heavily subsidized  rates. Although  in this paper we do not
'  See, however,  Barclay  and Smith (1996) for an empirical  investigation  of the detenninants  of
the maturity  structure  of firms' debt for US firms.
2intend  to  provide  a  detailed  analysis  of  such  government  interventions,  an
understanding  of  the nature  and  consequences  of maturity  choices  is a  step  towards
evaluating their potential effects and  desirability.
The  main  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  a  thorough  investigation  of
various  issues related  to the maturity  structure  of firms'  debt using panel data  at the
company level for the UK and Italy. We first review the insights on the determinants of
the maturity  composition  of debt that  can be obtained  from  the theoretical  literature.
We  then document  how  different  firms'  characteristics  are  related  to  their  maturity
choices  by  estimating  a  maturity  equation  and  interpret  them  in  the  light  of  the
theoretical predictions.  The next step is to analyze what are the effects of maturity on
firms'  subsequent performance,  in terms of profitability,  growth,  and productivity.  To
this end we present  descriptive evidence on the average profit rate,  the rate of growth
in real sales, and the investment rate calculated over four year periods,  when the firm-
year  observations  are  sorted  by  initial  maturity.  We  also  estimate  a  Cobb-Douglas
production function and assess how total factor productivity depends upon the degree of
leverage and the maturity composition  of debt.  Finally,  we present empirical evidence
on the effect  of financial factors,  including the maturity  structure  of debt,  on firms'
investment policies by estimating a simple accelerator  model.
The advantage of investigating these issues both for the UK and Italy is related
to the differences  in  the two  countries  financial  structure.  In the UK  (as  in the  US)
3publicly issued financial instruments are an important source of external finance.2 taly,
instead,  is characterized  by  much  less developed  financial  markets  and  by  a  greater
reliance  on  banks  or  on  related  financial  intermediaries  that  provide  most  of  the
external funds.3 Moreover  Italy has made a greater use of subsidized credit as a policy
tool to  affect the  geographical  and  sectoral  allocation  of  investment and  to  promote
exports.  It has also been used to facilitate  the adjustment  of particular  sectors  and  to
promote the development of small enterprises.  The importance of subsidized credit has
been decreasing  over  time, but  its role was still important over the period  covered by
our  panel.  A comparison  of  the empirical  results  for  the two countries  allow us to
understand whether these institutional differences matter  in explaining both  the choice
and consequences of the maturity structure of debt.
2. Determinants of Maturity and the Maturity-Performance Relationship
At present,  there is not a unified treatment of  debt maturity decisions by firms
that allows for a different structure of returns from firms'  existing and new assets,  for
the choice between market and intermediated debt, and between debt and equity. 4 What
2  Although  the differences  between  Italy and the UK are incontrovertible,  one must be careful
in not overemphasizing  the importance  of securities  markets  (relative  to retentions  and banks) in the UK.
See Section  3 for further discussion.
See Section  3 for more  details.
4  In certain cases the maturity  choice is intertwined  with the choice  of intermediated  versus non
intermediated  debt, with banks  providing  most of short term debt and the market  most of long term debt.
4does  exist  is  a  limited  number  of  contributions  that,  using  drastic  simplifying
assumptions,  highlight  some  particular  aspect  of  the  maturity  choice.  Although  less
general than one would wish, these contributions are useful in providing some guidance
for empirical work and we will review them briefly.
Most  of  the papers  underline  the  advantages  of  short  term  debt  in  reducing
agency  problems  under  asymmetric  information  and  imperfect  or  costly  contract
enforcement.  One  important advantage  of  shorter  term  debt has been  described  by
Myers  (1977).  When  investment  is  fnanced  through  debt,  this  creates  an  incentive
problem  because the  return  of  the  project  has  to  be  split between  shareholders  and
bondholders.  Stockholders may not capture enough of the return, so that they may pass
over positive net present value projects.  The greater  the investment opportunities  are,
the greater the conflict between shareholders and bondholder is, as well as the agency
cost  associated with the under-investmnent  problem.  This  agency cost  can be reduced
by decreasing  the overall  degree  of leverage,  but also  by restrictive  covenants  or  by
reducing the maturity of debt.  If the debt matures bef6re the investment option has to
be exercised,  the under-investment  problem  can  be  shown  to disappear.  Therefore,
everything else equal,  one would expect to  see a shorter  maturity associated  with the
existence of more investment opportunities.
As we have already explained,  in Italy also long term debt is provided  mostly  by specialized  fmancial
intermediaries.  On the general issue of the role and differences  of intermediated  debt and arm's-length
debt  see Diamond  (1984),  Calomiris  and Kahan (1991)  and Rajan  (1992).
5In  a  model  with  asymmetric  information  about  borrower's  type,  Diamond
(1991)  shows that  firms of  higher  quality  (with  higher  credit  rating)  should choose
short  term  debt  because  they  will  be  able  to  take advantage  from  the  revelation  of
future good news. This positive information effect outweighs the risk of not being able
to  refinance  oneself and  running  the  risk  of being liquidated  by the lender  (liquidity
risk).  The opposite is true for firms with lower credit rating. However,  still lower rated
borrowers  can issue  only  short term  debt,  so that the  relationship between  length of
maturity  and  credit  rating  is  non-monotonic.5 Note  that,  by  ruling  out  equity,  the
Diamond  model  cannot  shed  light  on  the  effect  of  the  degree  of  leverage  on  the
maturity choice.  However,  it is likely that firms with little debt are less exposed to the
liquidity  risk.  This  implies  that highly  leveraged  firms  would tend to  choose  longer
term debt.
In the Diamond model the time structure of returns  from the investment project
is kept fixed. In a recent paper Hart and More (1994) discuss how the maturity of firms
6 debt varies with the timing of  project returns.  More specifically, in a model in which
the entrepreneur  cannot  be  costlesly  replaced,  they  show  that  the  faster  the  returns
(assumed  to  be  perfectly  certain)  arrive,  the  shorter  will  the  optimal  repayment
structure  (maturity) of debt be.  This provides  a rationale for the conventional wisdom
5  The prediction  of a positive  association  between  firn  quality  and the amount  of short term debt
issued is also found in Kale and Noe (1990). In equilibrium,  better firms will issue more short term debt
and  worse firms  more long  term debt.
6  See also Hart and Moore  (1995).
6that  suggests  that  the  maturity  of  assets  and  liabilities  should  be  matched.  Another
important prediction of their model is that, as the durability (liquidation value) of assets
increases,  debt  becomes  longer  term.  A  support  of  the  conventional  view  about
matching  of assets  and  liabilities  is also  provided  by  Myers  (1977).  Since assets  in
place allow  the firm  to support  more  debt,  one can  think of matching  as  scheduling
debt repayments to correspond with the decline in the value of existing assets.
Just as there does not exist a unified treatment  of the maturity choice,  there  is
no contribution  in  the literature  that  provides  a thorough  analysis of the  relationship
between  maturity  and  subsequent  firm  performance  in  terms  of  productivity,
profitability  and firm  growth.  This could be achieved,  for  instance, by endogeneizing
the  level  of  effort  of  the  entrepreneur  or  of  managers.  Obviously  some  of  the
arguments  we have reviewed  above do  have a bearing  on this  issue.  For  instance,  if
the  use  of  short  term  debt  reduces  the  likelihood that  firms  will pass up  profitable
investment opportunities,  we would expect more short term debt to be associated with
greater future investment and profitability,  everything else equal.
More  in  general,  arguments  similar  to  the  ones  associated  with  the  role  of
leverage as a discipline device are likely to  apply7. Because of  the more continuous
scrutiny of firms'  actions  and threat  of  liquidation  that is associated  with  short  term
debt,  one may expect a reduction  in wasteful activities  by managers and,  possibly,  a
greater  search for efficiency  in all the  firm's  operations.  This  should lead to  greater
7See,  for instance,  Jensen  (1986), (1989).
7productivity  and profitability.  The prediction concerning investment and sales growth
is instead more ambiguous, because the more frequent pressure to disburse free cash
flow that comes with  short term debt, may decrease  the ability to pursue empire
building tendencies, leading  to lower investment  and sales growth.
The favorable effects of a shorter maturity composition  of firms' debt we have
described so far could be counterbalanced by the  fact that fear of liquidation may
induce firms not to choose investment projects characterized by greater returns, in a
present value sense, but accruing further into the future. Similarly, more productive
technologies might not be adopted, unless they provide an immediate payoff. This
shortening of the investment horizon may have, therefore, negative  consequences  on
the overall performance  of the firm.  The idea that long term finance is very important
for firms' growth, together with the assessment that in certain circumstances  it is not
adequately  provided by the market, is implicit in the policies adopted in the past both
by some  national  governments  and by international  financial  institutions, like the World
Bank.  In Italy, for instance  this took the form of fostering the development  of Istituti
di Credito Speciale, that provided long term loans, often at subsidized  rates, to firms in
order to  promote the  development of  particular geographical regions, to  favor the
growth of small firms, and to help certain sectors. At the international  level, the World
Bank contributed  to the creation of  Development  Finance Corporations, and provided
financial support to  other programs designed to  extend long term loans to  firms.
Because of  the  widespread nature  of  these  policies,  an  understanding of  the
8determinants  and of the consequences  of the maturity choice by firms is more than an
academic exercise.
3. The Structure of Financial Markets, Data and Definitions
According  to common wisdom the UK has one of the most developed  financial
systems in the world, where financial markets are perceived  to play a prominent role
in channeling funds from savers to industrial firms.  Indeed, in the financial literature
the UK  system is taken as one of the two real world examples, the other being the US,
of what is commonly defined as a  "market-based system". This characterization is
indeed supported by  various indices of  the  importance of  the  stock market.  For
instance, the stock market to GDP ratio equals .92 in the period 1986-1993 and this
places the UK in sixth place in the world in terms of stock market development (see
Demirguc-Kunt  and R. Levine (1995)). The corresponding  figure for Italy is .16 which
puts Italy in twenty-ninth  place. The bond market capitalization  relative to GDP equals
.025 in the UK in 1986, smaller than in the US (.238), but higher than in Italy (.007)
(see Rajan and Zingales (1995)). However, as noted by Mayer (1988), the role of the
markets in financing the corporate sector in the UK is often overemphasized  since in
the 1970-85  period retentions accounted for 74% of the financing of total assets, with
bank loans covering  the majority  of external funding.
As in the UK, retentions account  for most of  corporate sector's total funding in
9Italy as well (61.8%  for a closed sample of 972 large private  firms  over  the  1982-90
period).  Nevertheless,  the differences  between the two financial systems are profound.
In particular,  both the stock and the bond market  play a very  limited role  in Italy,  as
the  aggregate  data  on  market  capitalization  we  have  reported  suggest.  Very  few
companies  are quoted and,  furthermore,  public companies  in the conventional  Anglo-
Saxon  sense  do  not  exist.  On the  contrary,  family  groups  hold  controlling  interests
through a pyramidal hierarchy of financial and operational firms and cross-shareholding
abounds. Firms get a substantial proportion of external financial sources (both long and
short  term)  from  banks  or  from  other  financial  institutions  (for  the same  sample  of
Italian  firms  bank  debt represented  in  1990 about  75%  of total  financial debt  with
8 intra-group financial debt covering much of the rest).  In spite of recent privatizations,
the  influence of  the  Government  on  banks'  behavior  is  still  large,  and  it was  even
larger  in  the  period  covered  by  our  panel  (1977-90)  when  the  largest  banks  were
directly owned by the State. According to Italian banking law,  until the early nineties
financial  intermediaries  were  segmented  in  two  separate  categories:  "Banche
Ordinarie"  (Commercial  Banks) and  "Istituti  di  Credito  Speciale - ICS"  (Investment
Banks),  specialized in supplying  short-term  and  long term  loans respectively.  One of
the reasons why firms did not rely more on direct  bond issues is that ICS could issue
I  Notice  that the  ratio  of domestic  bank  credit  to the  private  sector  relative  to GDP  is higher
for the UK than for Italy, but this indicator  is misleading  to judge the importance  of banks  for firms'
financing.  In fact,  domestic  bank  credit  includes  also  credit  to consumers  and  Italy  is notorious  for the
narrowness  of its mortgage  and  consumer  credit  markets.
1 0tax free bonds to finance their operations.  Moreover,  some of the ICS's  loans were  at
subsidized rates,  although the fraction  has decreased  steadily over  time.  In  1977,  for
instance,  35% of total  funds intermediated by ICS was at subsidized rate.  In  1990 the
figure has decreased to 26.2%.
This  is the  background against  which  one has  to assess  our empirical  results.
The empirical  work in  this paper  is based  on two  rich unbalanced panels of UK  and
Italian companies with at least five years  of consecutive observations. The UK panel is
constructed from the balance sheet data collected by Datastream. It includes 604 quoted
companies  over  the period  1976-1991 and contains  5244 observations.  The panel  for
Italy is constructed  using  the balance  sheet data collected  by Mediobanca.  It  includes
750 private  companies,  mostly unquoted,  over  the period  1977-1990 and  it contains
6327 observations.  (see Table 1 for a detailed description of the unbalanced structure  of
the two panels).
Throughout  our  empirical  work  we  will  rely  on  a  definition  of  maturity,
calculated  as long term debt divided  by  the sum of long term and short term financial
debt.  Account payables (trade debt) is excluded from the definition of short term debt.9
Short  term  debt  is  defined differently  for  Italy  and  for  the  UK.  For  the  UK,  it  is
9  This decision  is mainly  due to data limnitations.  In fact, trade  debt is available  as a separate  item
for the UK only for the more recent years.  Account  payables  are, instead,  available  for Italy. When we
include  them in the definition  of short  term debt,  the econometric  results  we describe  below  remain, on the
whole,  unalterd.
11defined as loans that are due to be repaid in less than one year,  including therefore long
term  loans  with less  than a year  to  maturity.  This  portion  of long  term  debt  is not
included  in  short term  debt in  Italy.  However,  the  latter contains  also,  intra-group
financial  debt,  which  in  principle  one  would  want  to  keep  separate.  Aggregate
information  from  a smaller  sample of 972 private  large firms,  suggests that  financial
intra-group debt represents over the period an average of 13.2% of total financial debt.
In  Table  2  we  present  the  evolution  over  time  of  the  mean,  median  and
standard deviation  of  the ratio between long term and total debt for both the UK and
Italy. Although cross countries comparisons must be treated with some caution because
the definition of maturity is not exactly identical for the two countries,  it appears that
the maturity composition  of debt is not dramatically different  in the UK and  in Italy.
Also,  the UK data  suggest that,  whatever measure  of centrality  is used,  the maturity
composition of debt becomes shorter during the recession years at the beginning of the
80's,  while  it  lengthens  during  the  prolonged  expansion  that  follows.  This  trend
continues also at the onset of the recessionary period at the end of the 80's,  beginning
of  the  90's.  The  movements  for  Italy  are  less pronounced  and  are  sensitive  to  the
measure of centrality adopted. The only clear trend is the increase in  the average value
of maturity from  1984 to at least 1988, which is also a period of fast economic growth.
4. Empirical Evidence
In  this  section  we  present  descriptive  and  econometric  evidence
12on firns'  maturity choice and on the relationship  between the maturity structure of debt
and firms' subsequent  performance.
4.1 Maturity Choices: Descriptive Statistics and Econometric Analysis
Before estimating a maturity equation, it is useful to start from some summary
statistics  about maturity and firms characteristics.  In Table 3 for the UK and in Table 4
for Italy we report, in addition  to the maturity composition  of debt, MAT, the maturity
structure of assets, ASS, measured as the ratio between fixed assets at replacement  cost
and total assets. Total assets are defined as the sum of fixed assets and gross working
capital. The latter includes inventories and accounts receivable and other short term
credits due to the firm. We also report information  on  leverage (excluding  trade debt),
LEV, on the cash flow to asset ratio, CFK, on the log of real sales, LY, on the growth
rate of real sales, DLY, and on the liquid financial assets to total assets ratio, LIQK
(only for the UK, due to data limitations). The means of all the variables are reported
for both the total samples and for the sub-samples  of observations  below and above the
median value of maturity length.
The first interesting aspect is that in both countries the mean maturity of debt
for long maturity firms (above the median) is more than four times larger than the
mean for short maturity  firms (below the median). This seems  to suggest that there may
be  very  different  (possibly  constrained)  strategies  concerning  maturity,  one
characterized  by a large role for long  term  debt,  representing in  this  case
13almost three quarters of total non trade (financial) debt, and the other with long term
debt playing decisively  a minor role, representing less than a fifth of total debt.
As  one  would  expect,  observations  with  longer  debt  maturity  are  also
characterized by an asset composition containing a higher proportion of  longer lived
assets.'0 Moreover longer debt maturity, larger size, and higher growth rates of real
sales also tend to go  together. One may regard some of these results as somewhat
surprising in the light of the theoretical arguments reviewed above. We will defer a
more detailed discussion of  these issues when we will comment on the regression
results.  Longer debt maturities are also positively associated  with a higher cash-flow
rate.  The association with total leverage is more confusing, as it is positive for  the
UK and negative with Italy. In the UK, longer maturity is also positively related to the
ratio between liquid financial  assets and total assets.
For Italy, firms can also be classified according to the structure of ownership:
firms associated with domestic business groups (1165 cases), subsidiaries  of  foreign
multinationals  (2022 cases), or independent  companies  (3140 cases)". Business groups
and  multinational corporations can  be  seen  as  organizational forms that  allow a
mitigation of  the  information problems that  arise  in  accessing external financial
11 The differences  between  the mean values  of  the various firm characteristics  for short and
long  maturity  observations  described  here are all statistically  significant  with  the exception  of the growth
rate of real sales.
11  For further information  on the methodology  used to split the sample, see Schiantarelli  and
Sembenelli  (1995).
14resources,  possibly also affecting the maturity structure  of debt. In order  to assess the
consequences  for  maturity,  we  have computed  the percentage  of  firms  belonging  to
each category  which  is above  (below) the  median  maturity.  No striking  differences
emerge.  However,  it appears that affiliates of domestic business groups have a longer
maturity. In  fact 53.0%  of the firm-year cases linked to domestic business groups are
characterized  by a longer maturity structure than the median.  The figure is 47.3%  for
affiliates of multinational corporations and 50.5  % for independent companies.
Although  bivariate correlations  are interesting,  a fuller  picture  of the maturity
choice is contained in Table 5,  where we present the results obtained from  estimating
various  specifications  of  the  maturity  equation.  The  dependent  variable  is  end  of
period maturity and the regressors are beginning of period maturity,  beginning and/or
end of  period leverage and liquidity ( the latter only for the UK),  the (end of period)
maturity structure of assets, contemporaneous cash flow and real sales, and present and
past growth rates of sales. Particularly when end of period values of the stock variables
are included as regressors,  one should think of this equation as one structural equation
that is part  of a more  general  system determining  firm's  financial (and  possibly  also
real) choices.  Since we only focus in this  section on the maturity equation,  obviously
our analysis is a partial one. Moreover  in estimation one must take into account of the
endogeneity problem resulting from the  simultaneity of at least financial choices.  For
this  reason  we also  present results  in  which  only  beginning  of  period  leverage  and
15liquidity are  included.12  Endogeneity of  the  regressors results also  from probable
measurement  errors and, in any case, one must allow for time invariant firm specific
components  of the error term. For all these reasons, all the equations are estimated by
the Generalized  Method of Moments in first differences to eliminate the firm specific
effects. Values of the regressors lagged at least twice are used as instruments  (Arellano
and Bond  (1988) and 1992)). All equations contain also year dummies that capture,
among  other factors, changes  in the relative cost of short term versus long term debt.
In both countries there is an element of persistence, in the sense that lagged
maturity has a (positive) and powerful effect on maturity today. The most robust result
is that the length of maturity is an increasing function of the percentage of fixed assets
out of total assets. This confirms the positive prediction of the models by Myers (1977)
and by  Hart and Moore (1994) that the maturity of  assets and liabilities should be
matched, just  as  prescribed by  common wisdom. The positive coefficient on  the
variable ASS also has a collateral  based explanation.  If fixed assets are the ones more
easily collateralizable,  and long term debt is the form of debt that is more likely to be
backed by collateral, we would expect a positive association between the maturity
composition  of assets and liabilities.
We allow for a non linear effect of size (proxied here by the log of real sales)
on maturity by entering  both the log of real sales and its value squared (these results
12  We have also experimented  with including  only lagged values  of ASS and we have obtained
results  that are similar  to the ones reported  in the text.
16one is that,  since many of the programs  were  designed to redress regional  imbalances
and to  ease transition  problems in sectors  experimenting  structural  problems,  it is by
design  that  operating  cash  flow  is less  positively  associated  with  long  term  debt  (or
even negatively associated with it, when the fraction of subsidized credit  is very high).
In any case this  result must be treated  with some caution  because we have used  only
information at the aggregate level,  since firm by firm data on the nature of long term
debt is not available.
We try  to  capture  the existence of growth  options by the growth  rate of  sales
between t and t-1,  DLYt,  and between t-1 and t-2,  DLYt1. The suggestion by Myers
(1977) is that the existence of growth  options should be associated with greater  use of
short  term debt to  control for the greater  likelihood of conflicts between  shareholders
and bondholders.  There is empirical support for this prediction for Italy but not for the
UK.  In Italy,  the coefficient of lagged  growth  is negative,  as well as the sum of the
coefficients when both contemporaneous and lagged growth  are entered  as regressors.
However they are all positive for the UK.  How much weight one should put on these
results depends on how well one thinks present and past sales growth help in predicting
future growth opportunities.
The effect of leverage on maturity  is mostly positive.  This  is what one would
expect  since higher leverage increases the threat of liquidation and this would induce
firms to  shy away  from short  term  debt.  Another  explanation  is that firms  with  few
growth options are less likely to underinvest  when it would be profitable.  In this case
conflicts  between  shareholders  and  bondholders are  less severe and  more
18debt and of a longer maturity can be supported.  In this sense high leverage works as a
proxy for lack of growth opportunities.  Also the free cash flow hypothesis  would imply
that high leverage and reduced availability of investment opportunities are positively
correlated, although the reasons are different. In  this case debt is a mechanism to
reduce the agency costs of the conflict between inside managers and outside providers
of finance, and to put a check on the over-investment  and empire building tendencies  of
management  by forcing them to pay-out the accumulated  cash. A final explanation, is
that a high level of debt, conditional  on having survived and, therefore, on being in the
sample, summarizes all those positive characteristics  that have allowed firms to obtain
credit in the past. Then the positive leverage coefficient  suggests  that it is credit worthy
for firms that have access or find optimal to use long term debt (just as implied by the
positive cash flow coefficient).
The effect of the beginning of period stock of liquid balances on the length of
maturity for the  UK  is negative, while the association with end of  period liquid
balances is  positive and  larger in  absolute value. One possible explanation for  a
negative association is that firms may be asked by banks to maintain compensating
liquid balances as a condition to obtain short term credit. It is also possible that firms
may desire to hold liquid assets as a buffer to absorb the liquidity risk associated  with
short term debt. Alternatively, a greater liquidity ratio may be a sign, just like cash
flow,  of the overall health of the firm and will therefore be associated  with a longer
debt maturity, as in the case of cash flow.
194.2 Maturity  and Performance
What is the correlation between the maturity structure of debt and subsequent
performance? This is a very important question that we address first by discussing
some simple descriptive statistics and then by estimating both a productivity and an
investment equation with maturity as an additional explanatory variable. In Tables 6
and 7 we divide all firm-year observations according to whether maturity falls below
the first quartile, between the first and the third, or above the third quartile. We then
calculate for each  sub-sample the  average growth rate of  real sales,  the  average
investment  rate and the average cash flow rate. For Italy the growth rate of sales and
the cash flow rate are  monotonically  increasing  in the length of maturity. The same is
basically true also for the UK, although in this case  the rate of growth in real sales
increases  with maturity only for the group above the third quartile. For both countries
the largest change occurs when the observations with maturity above the third quartile
are compared to  the rest, although they tend not to  be statistically significant. The
investment rate increases with maturity in both countries as well, but the change is
rather small.  The prima facie evidence is not supportive therefore of  the idea that
short term debt provides a better disciplining  device that improves  firms' performance.
However,  it  may  be  misleading to  rely  only  on  bivariate  correlations.
Additional evidence on this issue is provided in Table 8. In this Table we report the
results of estimating a simple Cobb-Douglas  gross production function that includes
maturity  and  leverage  (at  the  beginning of  period or  both  at  the
20beginning and end of period) as explanatory variables  in addition to capital,  labor and
materials.  We  include  leverage  as  a  regressor  to  control  for  the  impact  of  general
financial pressure on productivity.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio
between  sales and  the capital stock,  LYK.  The regressors  are the  log of the  ratio  of
employment to  the capital stock,  LNK,  the  log of the ratio  between material  and  the
capital stock,  LMK, and the log of the capital stock  itself,  LK.  This equation  is also
estimated in first differences by GMM.  Removal of the firm specific component  of the
error  term and instrumenting is important  to minimize  the risk that the coefficient  on
maturity  may simply  reflect the  fact  that  better  firms  or  firms  that enjoy  a  positive
idiosyncratic shock receive more long term debt.  The capital stock coefficient suggests
a mild (especially for Italy) but  significant degree of decreasing returns  to scale.  The
elasticity of output with respect to materials  is somewhat high  (.7) for both countries,
while the one  for capital is unrealistically  large  for the UK.  The conclusions on the
effect of maturity depend upon the timing  of the maturity variable.  The lagged length
of  the  maturity  composition  has  an  economically  (although  not  statistically)
insignificant  effect  in  the  UK  and  a  positive  and  significant  (economically  and
statistically)  effect  in  Italy.  When  both  contemporaneous  and  lagged  maturity  are
entered  as regressors,  the sum of the coefficients  is positive  and significant  for both
countries.  On balance,  the results are more supportive of the idea that long term debt
allows  access to  better  technologies  and  that  it allows  firms  to  be  more productive,
while there  is little  or no  support  for  the  idea that  short term  debt  increases  firms'
efficiency.
21In  Table  8,  we  also  report  an  interesting  result  concerning  the  productivity
effects of subsidized credit.  In the last column we have allowed the coefficient on the
maturity  variables  to depend upon  the aggregate proportion  of the stock of long  term
debt from ICS that is subsidized, AG (we do not have information on the availability of
subsidized  credit  at  the  firm  level).  The  coefficients  on  both  interaction  variables
between maturity  and the proportion  of subsidized credit  are negative and the one on
the  contemporaneous  interaction  is  highly  significant.  Since  the  coefficients  on  the
interaction  variables  are  approximately  twice  as  large  in  absolute  value  as  the
coefficients on maturity and since the proportion of subsidized credit fluctuates between
a quarter and a third of the total,  this implies that the positive effect of the availability
of long term credit is very much reduced,  and it can even be reversed when the fraction
of subsidized credit  is high.1 3 The caveats on the use of only aggregate information on
subsidized credit  applies here as well.
The  effect  of  leverage  is negative  and  significant for  both  Italy  and  the  UK
which means that being under financial pressure  does not lead to greater productivity.
Actually  the  opposite  seams  to  be  the  case.'4 This  result,  therefore,  does  not  lend
support  to  those  theories  that  emphasize  the  role  of  financial  pressure  in  inducing
13  On  the  effect  of subsidized  credit  in Japan  see Calomiris  and  Himmelberg  (1995).
14  Nickell  and Nicolitsas  (1995)  obtained  the opposite  result for the UK, when using  the
coverage  ratio (interest  payments  divided  by cash flow) as measure  of leverage.  However, when  we  add
the  coverage  ratio  to our original  specification  the results  are  virtually  unchanged  with  the  stock  measure
dominating  the flow measure. On the effect of financial  distress on corporate  performance,  see also Opler
and Titman  (1994).
22managers to make choices that improve the firm's  performance  (Jensen (1986),  (1989)
and Wruck (1990)). However, a high leverage may also weaken the incentive to pursue
efficiency, since borrowers'  relative stake in the firm is smaller. 15
Finally,  to test whether the maturity  structure  of debt has an  impact on firms'
investment  policies,  we  estimate  a  simple  augmented  accelerator  model,  with  the
investment rate as dependent variable and the rate of growth  in sales,  the ratio of cash
flow to  total  assets,  leverage,  and  the  maturity  structure  of debt  as  regressors.  We
allow  the  maturity  variable  to  enter  both  contemporaneusly  and  lagged  once.  A
significant cash flow variable is likely to capture the importance of financing constraints
and may also reflect the fact that contemporary cash flow acts as a proxy  for expected
profitability.' 6 Also, higher leverage should lead to a greater premium on debt and then
have a negative impact on investment, if the rate of interest is an increasing function of
firm's  leverage because of the existence of agency and/or  financial distress costs.1 7 As
mentioned  in  Section 2,  the prediction  on  the relation  between  investment  and  debt
maturity is instead ambiguous. However,  the common wisdom is that the availability of
long term finance should stimulate investment in fixed capital by reducing the fear of
liquidation and by allowing firms to make long term plans.  Moreover,  if  the interest
15 The  adverse  consequences  of the  conflict  between  borrowers  and  lenders  is emphasized  in
Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976),  Myers  (1977),  Stulz  (1990).
16 See Fazzari,  Hubbard  and  Petersen  (1988)  for an empirical  investigation  of cash  flow and
financing  constraints.
17  See Lang,  Ofek  and  Stulz  (1995)  for  an  empirical  analysis  using  US firms  panel  data.
23rate  on  loans  is subsidized,  as it  was the case  in  Italy  for  some  firms,  the cost  of
borrowing would also be lower.
The results for our investment equations estimated by GMM in first differences
are presented  in Table  9.  As expected,  the coefficients  on the rate of  growth  in  real
sales  are  positive  and  significant  both  for  the  UK  and  for  Italy.  Analogously,  the
coefficients  on contemporary  cash flow are positive and significant for both countries.
However,  the size of the coefficient for  Italy  is almost twice as large as that  for the
UK,  possibly  suggesting  that capital  market  imperfections  faced by  firms  are  more
important in Italy than in the UK. The coefficients on beginning of period leverage are
negative  and  significant  for  both  countries,  as  suggested  by  the  financial  distress
hypothesis.
Finally,  the coefficient  on  the contemporary  maturity  variable is  positive  and
significant for UK firms,  while the one on the lagged maturity variable is opposite in
sign,  significant,  and  almost  identical  in absolute  value.  This  suggests that  it is the
change in maturity that affects investment positively  in the UTK,  although the effect  is
not very large (the results when this restrictions  is imposed are reported in the second
column).  The maturity coefficients are never significant for Italian fims.  The results
do  not  change when  maturity  is  interacted  with  the proportion  of  subsidized credit.
The sign of the interaction terms are,  however,  positive as one would  expect.  Since
the panel for Italy includes mostly unquoted companies,  some of which  may be at an
informational disadvantage, we have also re-estimated the investment equation allowing
(all)  the  coefficients  to  differ  according  to  whether  firms  are
24associated  with  domestic  business  groups,  are  subsidiaries  of  multinational
corporations, or are independent  firms. 8  For reasons of space we do not report the
detailed results.  However, it is interesting to note that the cash flow coefficient is
significant only  for  independent firms (.41  with  a  t  statistic of  3.3),  and,  more
importantly  from our point of view, the coefficient  of the change in maturity variable is
significant and positive only for members of domestic groups (.11 with a t statistic of
3.08). It is insignificant and minuscule for the other firms. This result is somewhat
surprising because one would have expected that an increased access to  long term
(possibly subsidized  ) debt would be associated  with greater investment, especially for
financially  constrained  independent  firms.
5. Conclusions
What are the main conclusions  we can derive from the empirical investigation  of
the determinants and consequences  of the maturity structure of debt for our panel of
UK and Italian firms?  One of the most robust results for both countries is that,  in
choosing the maturity structure of debt, firms tend to match assets and liabilities as
suggested both by  the conventional wisdom and by some recent theoretical models
(Hart and Moore (1995)).  A second general conclusion is that more profitable firms
18 All the firms in the  UK panel are quoted and represent a relatively  more homogeneous  set relative to
the Italian fims  in our panel.
25(as measured by the cash flow to capital ratio, are characterized by a longer maturity
structure of debt. This finding  is consistent, on the demand side, with a dominant role
played by the fear of liquidation  and loss of control in the choice of maturity by firms.
Short of liquidation, a more frequent renegotiation of the debt contract may give an
advantage to the supplier of finance in appropriating at least part of the firm surplus,
particularly if informational  asymmetries  weaken the competitive  nature of the market
for loans.  For some of the Italian firms, the incentive to choose long term debt may
also be associated with the existence of subsidized credit, in which case the positive
association between length of debt maturity and cash flow is reduced and possibly
reversed, when the fraction of subsidized  credit is high.  On the supply side, financial
markets seem willing to provide long term finance only to quality firms and prefer
instead to  subject lower quality firms to the more continuous monitoring which is
associated  with short-term finance.
From a policy point of view, one of the most interesting results that emerges
from our analysis is that there is no support in the data for the hypothesis  that short
term debt has better monitoring and control properties, and may, therefore, boost
efficiency and growth. If anything, the  empirical results we present in  this paper
suggest that the opposite may be true.  In particular, the descriptive statistics  point out
to the existence  of a positive relation in both countries  between initial maturity and the
subsequent  medium-ran  performance  of the firm in terms of profitability  and growth in
real sales. Moreover, for Italy and the UK, total factor productivity  depends  positively
26upon  the  length  of  debt  maturity  when  the  maturity  variable  is  entered  both
contemporaneously and lagged.
However,  and this is equally  important for policy,  in Italy the positive effect of
the length  of  maturity  on productivity  is  substantially  reduced  or  even reversed  the
larger is the proportion  of subsidized credit,  which points to the disincentive effects of
financial subsidies.  This issue is very important and it deserves a closer investigation.
Optimally one would want to be able to rely upon firm level information on the sources
and conditions attached to all loans,  which,  however,  is not available for the firms  in
our panel. Finally the results from the investment equations suggest a positive,  but not
very large, effect of an increase in the length of maturity on the quantity of investment
for UK firms and for some of the Italian firms.
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30Table 1
Structure of the Samples
UK  UK  Italy  Italy
Period  1976-1991  1977-1990
Firms  604  750
Num. obs.  Num. cases  Num. firns  Num. cases  Num. firms
16  112  7  0  0
15  630  42  0  0
14  602  43  952  68
13  221  17  208  16
12  312  26  444  37
11  154  14  583  53
10  300  30  - 590  59
9  567  63  693  77
8  712  89  800  100
7  665  95  630  90
6  474  79  1062  177
5  495  99  365  73
Total  5244  604  6327  750Table 2
Descriptive statistics on maturity for the UK and for Italy
UK  UK  UK  UK  Italy  Italy  Italy  Italy
Year  Cases  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  Cases  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median
1976  91  0.48241  0.34493  0.52029
1977  223  0.47127  0.36532  0.51233  246  0.41318  0.30393  0.37955
1978  244  0.46161  0.35996  0.45703  251  0.45824  0.31469  0.41849
1979  259  0.41114  0.33293  0.40286  300  0.46346  0.32201  0.44544
1980  279  0.39672  0.33233  0.36257  367  0.43090  0.29278  0.41629
1981  295  0.41160  0.34507  0.36155  427  0.46408  0.30006  0.45242
1982  307  0.39881  0.34385  0.33815  497  0.44762  0.29500  0.43083
1983  400  0.41814  0.33586  0.40172  538  0.44514  0.29258  0.42800
1984  455  0.40584  0.31268  0.39868  553  0.43014  0.28937  0.40920
1985  465  0.42232  0.31249  0.42784  624  0.46293  0.30905  0.43482
1986  470  0.43084  0.31190  0.43933  610  0.47875  0.32707  0.46020
1987  464  0.44588  0.31014  0.46391  554  0.46418  0.31653  0.44342
1988  433  0.44842  0.30297  0.45115  505  0.49638  0.33767  0.48950
1989  391  0.45236  0.29658  0.45271  459  0.47639  0.34457  0.41865
1990  348  0.45165  0.30830  0.45548  396  0.49264  0.34770  0.43033
1991  120  0.47296  0.31803  0.51236
Average  5244  0.43198  0.32359  6327  0.46041  0.31460
Legend:
maturity =  LTFD /(LTFD+STFD)
where:
LTFD = long term financial debt
STFD = short term financial debtTable 3
Maturity and other firms' characteristics: UK
(Data sorted by maturity)
Full sample  Below median  Above median  t-stat
Cases  5244  2622  2622
Sorted by MAT  Mean (Std. dev.)  Mean (Std. dev.)  Mean (Std. dev.)
MAT  0.432(0.324)  0.151(0.146)  0.713(0.173)
ASS  0.555(0.155)  0.530(0.156)  0.580(0.151)  11.72
LEV  0.124(0.116)  0.121(0.090)  0.128(0.136)  2.38
LIQK  0.047(0.065)  0.038(0.065)  0.055(0.065)  9.68
CFK  0.100(0.060)  0.094(0.064)  0.106(0.055)  7.60
LY  6.119(1.710)  5.588(1.415)  6.650(1.813)  23.65
DLY  0.050(0.231)  0.047(0.247)  0.053(0.213)  0.89
Legend:
ASS = FC / (FC + GWC + LIQ)
LEV = (LTFD + STFD) / (FC + GWC + LIQ)
CFK = CF / (FC + GWC + LIQ)
LIQK=LIQ/(FC+GWC+LIQ)
LY = log of real sales
DLY = rate of growth of real sales
where:
FC = fixed capital
GWC = gross working capital (liquidity excluded)
LIQ = liquidity
CF = operational cash flow
t-stat test for the significance of the difference in the meansTable 4
Maturity and other firms' characteristics: Italy
(Data sorted by maturity)
Full sample  Below median  Above median  t-stat
Cases  6327  3164  3163
Sorted by MAT  Mean(Std. dev.)  Mean(Std. dev.)  Mean(Std. dev.)
MAT  0.461(0.315)  0.194(0.142)  0.728(0.188)
ASS  0.436(0.172)  0.396(0.160)  0.476(0.174)  19.18
LEV  0.230(0.167)  0.250(0.167)  0.211(0.164)  9.40
CFK  0.120(0.085)  0.111(0.077)  0.129(0.092)  8.07
LY  6.253(0.896)  6.204(0.844)  6.301(0.942)  4.34
DLY  0.036(0.160)  0.033(0.155)  0.040(0.164)  1.66
Legend:
ASS = FC / (FC + GWC)
LEV=  (LTFD + STFD) / (FC + GWC)
CFK = CF / (FC + GWC)
LY = log of real sales
DLY = rate of growth of real sales
where;
FC = fixed capital
GWC = gross working capital (liquidity excluded)
CF = operational cash flow
t-stat test for the significance of the difference in the meansLegend:
Standard  errors  in round  brackets.  All  standard  errors  are robust  to time  series  and  cross-section
heteroskedasticity.
W=  Wald test of joint significance of the regressors (X 2 distribution).
W,= Wald test of joint significance of time dummies (X2  distribution).
Ml= Test for first order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
M2 = Test for second order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution).
Sargan = Sargan test of the correlation of the instruments with the error term (X 2 distribution).
Degrees of freedom in square brackets.Table 6
Measures of performance for the UK
(Data sorted by maturity)
Below Ist quartile  Above Ist and  Above 3rd quartile
belowe 3rd quartile
Mean (Std. dev.)  Mean (Std. dev.)  Mean (Std. dev.)
DLYt+I,t+ 4 0.046(0.136)  0.045(0.143)  0.056(0.134)
11'K-t+  I  J+4  0.110(0.076)  0.111(0.074)  0.116(0.075)
CFK  t+lt+4  0.088(0.049)  0.095(0.051)  0.103(0.043)
Table 7
Measures of performance for Italy
(Data sorted by maturity)
Below Ist quartile  Above Ist and  Above 3rd quartile
belowe 3rd quartile
Mean (Std. dev.)  Mean (Std. dev.)  Mean (Std. dev.)
DLYt+,,t+4  0.033(0.070)  0.035(0.076)  0.041(0.075)
IKt+  1,t+4  0.117(0.074)  0.118(0.073)  0.120(0.073)
CFKt+1,t+4  0.116(0.074)  0.118(0.070)  0.137(0.088)Table 8
Productivity equations for the UK and for Italy
Dependent variable: LYK,
UK  UK  Italy  Italy  Italy
GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM
First differ.  First differ.  First differ.  First  differ.  First  differ.
Period  1980-1991  1980-1991  1981-1990  1981-1990  1981-1990
Firms  604  604  750  750  750
Observations  2828  2828  3327  3327  3327
LMK,  0.701  (0.001)  0.703 (0.001)  0.707  (0.004)  0.709 (0.004)  0.704  (0.004)
LNK,  0.164  (0.002)  0.164 (0.002)  0.279  (0.005)  0.276  (0.006)  0.275  (0.006)
LK,  -0.104 (0.001)  -0.102  (0.001)  -0.013 (0.004)  -0.021  (0.005)  -0.027  (0.005)
LEV,  -0.116  (0.004)  -0.018  (0.003)  -0.025  (0.003)
LEV,.,  -0.109 (0.003)  -0.088  (0.003)  -0.049 (0.006)  -0.041  (0.006)  -0.040 (0.006)
MAT,  0.028  (0.001)  0.036  (0.002)  0.216  (0.025)
MAT,.L  -0.005 (0.001)  -0.019  (0.001)  0.019  (0.002)  0.009  (0.003)  0.070  (0.035)
MATt*AG,  -0.570 (0.082)
MATt.t*AG  ,  -0.168 (0.110)
WI  405603.3 [51  361445.6 [7]  106074.4  [5]  101109.6  (7]  111284.4  [9]
Wt  26854.9  [121  33290.1  [12]  1072.5  [101  1409.8  [10]  885.3  [10]
Ml  -1.12 [505]  -1.12 [505]  -4.16 [677]  -4.00  [677]  -3.93 [677]
M 2 -0.96 [426]  -1.03 [426]  -2.10 [500]  -2.09  [500]  -2.10 [500]
Sargan  442.3 [434]  441.0 [432]  394.5  [375]  393.8  [373]  391.3  [371]
Instruments  t-2,t-3  t-2,t-3,  t-3,t-4,....  t-3,t-4.Legend:
LYKt = log of salesdivided by the capital stock
LMKt = log of  materials divided by the  capital stock
LNKt =  log of  employment divided by the capital stock
LKt  = log of  the real capital stock
For other definitions see the legend in Table 5Table 9
Investment equations for the UK and for Italy
Dependent variable: IK,
UK  UK  Italy  Italy  Italy
GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM
First  differen.  First  differen.  First differen.  First differen.  First differen.
Period  1980-1991  1980-1991  1981-1990  1981-1990  1981-1990
Firrns  604  604  750  750  750
Observations  2828  2828  3327  3327  3327
IKt,_  0.082 (0.007)  0.081 (0.007)  0.064 (0.008)  0.063 (0.008)  0.063 (0.008)
CFK,  0.091 (0.024)  0.089 (0.024)  0.210 (0.043)  0.208 (0.044)  0.204 (0.043)
DLY,  0.144 (0.010)  0.143 (0.010)  0.034 (0.014)  0.039 (0.014)  0.035 (0.014)
DLYt 1. 0.031 (0.005)  0.031 (0.005)  0.021 (0.006)  0.024 (0.006)  0.021 (0.006)
LEVt 1 -0.273 (0.012)  -0.271 (0.012)  -0.062 (0.024)  -0.051 (0.025)  -0.063 (0.023)
MAT,  0.020 (0.004)  -0.019 (0.014)  -0.247 (0.147)
MATt.,  -0.022 (0.003)  0.011 (0.009)  -0.020 (0.144)
DMAT,  0.021 (0.003)  -0.013 (0.009)
MAT, -AG,  0.701 (0.451)
MAT,-, *AG  0.046 (0.434)
W  1534.4  [7]  1531.2  [6]  92.4  [7]  103.9  [91  89.2 [6]
W,  599.6 [121  630.2 [12]  77.6 [101  73.6 [10]  78.6 [10]
M,  -7.25 [5051  -7.25 [505]  -8.20 [677]  -8.23 [677]  -8.16 [677]
Ml  -0.55 [426]  -0.56 [426]  -0.96 [500]  -1.06 [500]  -0.94 [500]
Sargan  315.1 [3131  315.9 [3141  231.9 [213]  225.1 [211]  231.8 [214]
Instruments  t-2,t-3....  t-2,t-3,....  t-2,t-3  .....  t-2,t-3,....  t-2,t-3,
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